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Truth-in-Testing Legislation: A Brief for the 
Status Quo 
"[Elmpirid psychology," wrote Kant in 1786, "does not 
rise to the rank of a natural science because mathematics cannot 
be applied to the phenomena of inner sense . . . ."I Later phi- 
losophers have taken a kinder view of the status of psychology: 
but the difficulty of arriving a t  numerical descriptors of the 
mind persists. 
Measuring the mind is the job of the psychometrician, who 
uses instruments commonly called tests. His testing is evaluated 
according to its "validity," which in the jargon of the profession 
refers to the accuracy of the tests as measuring instruments; a 
test that measures what it purports to measure is said to be 
valid.' The scores of a perfectly valid test correlate exactly with 
the levels of whatever psychological phenomenon is being 
measured.' 
However, as Kant intimated, perfectly valid tests are an 
ideal rather than a reality. Validity rarely exceeds 0.60 (where 
one equals perfect validity): and in practice, levels of validity 
are considerably lower. Among college admission tests: for ex- 
ample, median validity coefficients range from 0.41 for the Scho- 
1. I. KANT, METAPHYSISCHE ANFANGSGR~NDE DER NATUPWISSENSCHAFT (Riga 1786). 
2. See, e.g., P. DESING, PALTERNS OF DISCOVERY IN THE SOCUL SCIENCES (1971); A. 
KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY (1964). 
3. E. BURNS, THE DEVELOPMENT, USE, AND ABUSE OF EDUCATIONAL TESTS 131 (1979); 
R. EBEL, ESSENTIALS OF EDUCATIONAL MEII~UREMENT 567 (1972). 
4. A number of common criticisms of testing are included within the concept of 
validity. For example, the allegation that test resulta correlate with the race or family 
income of the test taker is really a validity question. A test that actually measures race 
or family income when it is designed to measure other factors is invalid unless there is an 
external correlation, independent of the test, between race or family income and any 
qualities validly measured by the test. 
Similarly, the recent findings of the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMM., 
EFFECTS OF COACHING ON STANDARDIZED A MISSION EXAMINATIONS (1979), to the effect 
that pre-test "cramming" improves performance on the testa is also a validity problem. A 
test is supposed to measure certain long-term learning abilities not susceptible to cram- 
ming. Thus, if testa are vulnerable to cramming, they are less valid measures of the long- 
term abilities they seek to assess. 
5. L. CRONBACH, E~SENTIUS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 135 (3d ed. 1970). 
6. As used in this Comment, the word "college" is to be understood in a broad sense 
and includes graduate, law, medical, and dental schools as well as undergraduate 
institutions. 
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lastic Aptitude Test to 0.29 for the Graduate Management Ad- 
mission Test.' 
Despite their imperfect validity, however, tests are used as a 
basis for making important decisions. Tests largely determine 
which students are placed in programs for the mentally re- 
tarded,' which are denied diplomas due to their "functional illit- 
era~y,"~ and which are to be admitted to college, graduate study, 
or professional school. Tests are also used in deciding who may 
enter a certain profession or be employed at a certain job. Thus, 
to a great degree, testing charts one's course through life. At 
every decisive point in our educational system, a test appears 
either to direct a student toward further education and a more 
promising profession or to shunt him into a career requiring less 
education. 
Using partially invalid tests to determine whether educa- 
tional opportunities will be granted causes these opportunities 
to be unjustifiably withheld from some.1° For example, there are 
undoubtedly students who are refused admission to the colleges 
they prefer because their test scores are inaccurately low, even 
though the same studenta would have been welcomed at the 
same institutions had their scores more accurately reflected their 
abilities. 
This is a problem that is rightfully the subject of concern. It 
is manifestly unfair to deny an individual an opportunity be- 
cause of a test's misrepresentation of his abilities. Legislatures 
have shared this concern which has been reflected in the "truth- 
7. The median validity coefficient of the Scholastic Aptitude Test is 0.41; that of the 
Graduate Record Examination is 0.33; those of the Law School Admission Test and 
Graduate Management Admission Test are 0.36 and 0.29 respectively. These figures 
show the degree of correlation between test scores and the abilities to be measured. 1.0 
represents a perfect, positive correlation, 0.0 no correlation, and -1.0 a perfect negative 
correlation. EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, TEST USE AND VALIDITY 16 (1980). 
8. See Parents in Action on Special Education v. Hannon, No. 74 C 3586 (N.D. Ill. 
July 7, 1980); Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Hobson v. Hansen, 
269 F. Supp. 401, 475 (D.D.C. 1967), a f d  sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 
(D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (methods 
of classifying students as emotionally disturbed violated federally guaranteed rights). 
9. See, e.g., Debra P .  v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1979). See gener- 
ally Clague, Competency Testing and Potential Constitutional Challenges of "Every 
StudentJJ, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 469 (1979); Lewis, Certifying Functional Literacy: Compe- 
tency Testing and Implications for Due Rocess and Equal Educational Opportunity, 8 
J.L. & EDUC. 145 (1979). 
10. Employment testing that discriminates against minorities has been the subject 
of considerable litigation. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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in-testing" legislation recently enacted in California and New 
York.ll Similar statutues are under consideration in a number of 
other states." Nevertheless, even though a problem undeniably 
exists, there is good reason to doubt that legislation will be more 
effective than the status quo in solving it. This Comment will 
explore the various legislative possibilities in the testing area 
and compare them with present efforts to improve testing. 
Like much other consumer-oriented legislation, the New 
York statute uses disclosure as a means of effecting reform.lS It 
contains two separate disclosure provisions. The first requires 
that a testing company send a requesting test taker a copy of his 
raw score, his answer sheet, and a list of correct answers.14 The 
11. CAL. EDUC. CODE 55 99150-99160 (Deering Supp. 1980); N.Y. EDUC. LAW $8 340- 
. 
347 (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). Although test scores are used as criteria in making a 
number of crucial decisions in the course of a test taker's life, the New York and Califor- 
nia statutes deal with only one of these decisions: college admission. Query whether this 
limitation is defensible in light of the fact that the validity of all testing is imperfect, 
regardless of the use to which is is put. Has college admission testing been singled out for 
legislative treatment because it is more important than testing which can classify an . + 
individual as being mentally retarded or functionally illiterate? 
12. Letter from Allan Nairn to Alan Asay, (Sept. 16, 1980). The states listed by 
Nairn as considering truth-in-testing legislation are Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Loui- 
siana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania. The bills before the U.S. House of Representatives are H.R. . 
3564, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), and H.R. 4949,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). As of this 
writing, both bills are still pending before the Committee on Education and Labor. The 
last action taken by the committee was a hearing commenced on July 31, 1979. [1979- 
19801 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 11 35,017, 35,030. 
13. The New York statute is the most imitated truth-in-testing statute, and will 
therefore be discussed in this Comment as .typical. See Robertson, Examining the Exam- 
iners: The Trend Toward Truth in Testing, 9 J.L. & b u c .  167,180-84 (1980). However, 
the California statute differs from its New York counterpart in that it attempts to make 
testing companies more financially responsible. CAL. EDUC. CODE 5 99154 (Deering Supp. 
1980). 
14. The relevant portions of the New York law provide: 
2. Within ninety days after filing a standardized test pursuant to subdivi- 
sion one of this section and for a period of not less than ninety days after the 
offer is made, the test agency shall provide to the test subject the opportunity 
to secure: 
a. a copy of the test questions used to calculate the test subject's raw 
score; 
b. a copy of the test subject's answer sheet, or answer record where there is 
no answer sheet, together with a copy of the correct answer sheet to the same 
test with questions used to calculate the test subject's raw score so marked; 
and 
c. a statement of the raw score used to calculate the scores reported to the 
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second provision requires that a test company file with a govern- 
ment agency a list of questions used in scoring, the accompany- 
ing correct answers, and "any study, evaluation, or statistical re- 
port pertaining to a test."16 The documents thus filed become 
public records accessible under freedom of information laws? 
The statute neither provides aggrieved test takers a cause of ac- 
tion nor establishes any regulatory authority over the testing in- 
dustry; rather, it relies solely on disclosure to accomplish its 
objective. 
A. Disclosure to the Test Taker Identifying the Consumer 
The rationale underlying disclosure laws is that an informed 
consumer can better his lot in the marketplace because a com- 
petitive market offers several alternatives, which, when com- 
bined with accurate information, enable a consumer to select the 
option most advantageous to him. Certain information is diffi- 
cult to obtain, however, and so it is sometimes necessary to re- 
sort to a governmental mandate to force disclosure in order to 
give the consumer an informed choice and thereby restore a 
healthy degree of competition to the market.'' Accordingly, 
lenders who are required to disclose actual interest rates and 
other hidden costs in lending agreements theoretically put the 
borrower in the position to choose the most favorable terms he 
can find, which in turn gives lenders an incentive to make their 
test subject. 
N.Y. EDUC. LAW 8 342(2) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). 
15. The pertinent provisions of the New York law state: 
1. Within thirty days after the results of any standardized test are re- 
leased, the test agency shall file or cause to be filed in the office of the 
commissioner; 
a. a copy of all test questions used in calculating the test subject's raw 
score; 
b. the corresponding acceptable answers to those questions; and 
c. all rules for converting raw scores into those scores reported to the test 
subject together with an explanation of such rules. 
.... 
7. Documents submitted to the commissioner pursuant to this section shall 
be public records . . . . 
N.Y. EDUC. LAW 8 342(1), (7) (McKinney Supp. 1980-1981). 
16. The New York freedom of information law is N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW 88 84-90 (Mc- 
Kinney Supp. 1980-1981). 
17. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 273-76 (2d ed. 1977); Rhoades, 
Reducing Consumer Ignorance: An Approach and its Effect, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 309 
(1975). 
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terms more favorable.le 
The New York law apparently assumes that the test taker is 
the consumer in the admissions testing situation since disclosure 
is directed to him. I t  is more accurate, however, to view the col- 
lege using the test in its admission process as the consumer. It is 
true that the test taker pays for the test,'@ but he has little use 
for the test scores. Although he is naturally interested in any 
assessment of himself, he does not take the test to gain greater 
self-understanding but rather to gain entry into college. The col- 
lege exercises consumer decisionmaking power inasmuch as it is 
the college that decides which test, if any, it will use in its ad- 
mission program." The college chooses in the market without 
permitting the test taker to question the choice made." Thus, 
the college is the consumer, the testing company is the seller, 
and the test taker is merely a third party whose measurement is 
the commodity bought and sold. 
Since the test taker has little opportunity to comment about 
what goes on between the college and the testing company, dis- 
closure of information to the test taker has little effect on the 
test's validity. In directing disclosure to the test taker, the New 
York statute serves to inform someone who cannot act on the 
information provided. Although the test taker may learn by dis- 
closure that he has been invalidly tested, he remains powerless 
to improve the validity of the test. 
18. See 15 U.S.C. $8 1601-1681 (1976). However, the practical effect of the truth-in- 
lending law has been disappointing, especially in connection with low-income consumers. 
R. POSNER, supra note 17, a t  275; Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Re- 
form, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1969); Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in 
Consumer Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 400. 
19. Someone must bear the cost of an admissions program, and the college has no 
alternative but to charge the applicant. I t  would not be fair to expect students who have 
already been admitted to bankroll the applications of prospective students, especially 
those who are never admitted. Alumni and state governments also have little interest in 
financing the comparatively mundane admissions process. 
20. This market choice could not be made by the test taker because allowing him to 
choose from among several testa would force the college to accept the results of any of 
the test he might select. Such a practice would make it impossible to compare different 
candidates since the testa not only employ different scoring scales but may also measure 
different abilities. 
21. See DePina v. Educational Testing Serv., 31 A.D.2d 744, 297 N.Y.S.2d 472 
(1969); K.D. v. Educational Testing Serv., 87 Misc. 2d 657, 386 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. 
1976). Here again, one would not have it any other way. Since the college, not the test 
taker, is the primary user of the measurement, the test taker should not be the one to 
determine how he is to be measured. To give the test taker control over the measure- 
ment procedure would amount to giving him control over one of the criteria of his own 
admission, a matter in which he has considerable personal interest. 
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On the other hand, colleges are in a position to improve 
validity. They are already organized into groups for testing pur- 
poses, such as the College Board or the Law School Admissions 
Council. The typical contract between a college group and the 
testing company provides for development and administration of 
the test by the company but leaves ownership of the test in the 
college group, which also retains the right to set general testing 
policy and determine what the testing company will be paid.22 
Therefore, by acting collectively as owners of the test, they con- 
tract for the administration, scoring, and development of their 
test according to their specifications. The testing company is in- 
duced to cooperate because a contract for testing services could 
be awarded to any of several companie~.~~ 
An example of the control a college group wields over its 
test is found in the creation of the new Medical College Admis- 
sion Test (MCAT). Medical colleges decided to revise the old 
MCAT, and in consultation with practitioners, other interested 
parties, and testing experts appointed by the colleges, they de- 
veloped an entirely new test. The colleges initiated and carried 
out the revision, retaining the testing companies in an advisory 
role only.24 
There is no evidence that the testing experts hoodwinked 
the learned doctors or that a governmental disclosure mandate 
would have been of any assistance to the medical colleges. Dis- 
closure law theory presumes an ignorant or gullible consumer at 
the mercy of a seller with superior knowledge, but in the case of 
college admission testing, the theory does not apply. The college 
22. The property rights of colleges in their tests are currently the subject of litiga- 
tion arising out of the New York statute. In January, 1980, the Association of American 
Medical Colleges, which administers the Medical College Admission Test, was granted a 
preliminary injunction against application of the statute because of possible infringe- 
ment or preemption by the Federal Copyright Act. Association of Am. Medical Colleges 
v. Carey, 482 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). 
Colleges are already organized as groups of test users and bargain collectively with 
test companies. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Law School Admission Council and 
Educational Testing Service (July 1, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Agreement] reprinted in 
Truth in Testing Act of 1979: The Educational Testing Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 
3564 and H.R. 4949 Before the Sumcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational 
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. 
23. The nation's largest publishers of standardized educational tests are Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich Co.; McGraw-Hill Co.; IBM; Educational Testing Service (ETS); 
Houghton Mifflin Co. In addition, there are many smaller companies in the testing busi- 
ness. M. HOLMEN & R. DOCTER, EDUCATIONAL ND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 33-69 (1972). 
24. Hearings, supra note 22, a t  70-77 (statement of John Cooper). 
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groups are not gullible, and if they lack information, they pos- 
sess the resources to obtain it since they control the spending of 
the fees obtained from test takers.26 Thus, the colleges, as con- 
sumers of testing, do not require the forced disclosure that 
might be needed in the case of a poorly educated applicant for a 
revolving charge account. Moreover, test companies have no in- 
centive to deceive the colleges. The test company stands only to 
gain from efforts to develop a more valid test, and there is no 
reason to believe that they would not cooperate fully with the 
colleges' efforts to do so. Consequently, since colleges are the 
consumers of admission testing, it does not follow that disclo- 
sure by the testing company to the colleges needs to be required 
by statute. 
B. Disclosure of Test Research 
The second disclosure provision of the New York statute re- 
quires testing companies to make public their research on test- 
ing. However, this provision is of little value to the colleges, 
whose strong bargaining position already gives them ample ac- 
cess to the companies' research. Their contracts with the testing 
companies require timely reporting to the colleges of all relevant 
However, the New York statute's second disclosure 
provision does not direct disclosure exclusively to the college- 
consumer; rather, the entire public is made the object of disclo- 
sure. Apparently this provision dispenses altogether with the 
usual rationale for disclosure laws. Since disclosure is not di- 
rected to any identified consumer group but rather to the public 
as a whole, the rationale cannot be a matter of rectifying defects 
in the market structure. Instead, the purpose of the second pro- 
vision seems to be to subject the testing establishment to 
whatever public criticism may be aroused through exposure of 
its research, with the hope that such criticism will give testers an 
incentive to test better?' 
Any incentive that might thus be gained, however, is damp- 
25. Agreement, supra note 22. 
26. Id. 
27. Robertson, supra note 13, at 198-99. However, it is doubtful that the statute, as 
it stands, has enough teeth in it to bring about the disclosure it seeks. The statute, which 
calls for disclosure of "any study . . . pertaining to a test," is vague, and no regulations 
have been promulgated to specify more adequately what must be disclosed. Testers are 
therefore free to launder their reports, delete unfavorable findings, and even to delete 
the data and submit only bald conclusions. 
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ened by the fact that the tests' lack of validity is an open secret. 
It is common knowledge that the tests are partially invalid, and 
testing companies readily admit as much." Since the disclosure 
of research about test invalidity will not reveal anything really 
new, it cannot create a significantly greater incentive than al- 
ready exists.2s 
Moreover, the colleges already have a strong incentive to 
improve testing. All major colleges make substantial efforts to 
recruit the best young scholars. It is in their interest to identify 
the most desirable prospective students by the most accurate 
means. In turning away good students because of invalid scores, 
both the college and the students suffer loss. In fact, the col- 
lege's loss is compounded by the fad  that poor students with 
invalid high scores are admitted where they would otherwise be 
screened out. The need to use valid criteria to assemble the most 
capable student body possible is a powerful incentive to improve 
testing. Adding the threat of public embarrassment as an incen- 
tive where a strong incentive already exists amounts to using 
two whips where one would do. 
Because the colleges have both the power and the incentive 
to improve test validity, they can be relied upon to produce the 
desired improvement. The legislatures in New York and Califor- 
nia, however, deemed their own involvement to be necessary as 
well. Although their disclosure enactments will not be effective 
in solving the validity problem, the question remains whether a 
different legislative approach might be effective. 
A. Prohibition of Admission Testing 
Since the partial invalidity of college admission tests causes 
unfairness, one could argue that they should be prohibited. 
0 
28. See, e.g., EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, 1980-81 LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION BULLE- 
TIN 14-15 (1980); EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, GRE INFORMATION BULLETIN 1980-81, at 
17-18 (1980); EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, GRE INFORMATION BULLETIN 1979-80, at 13- 
14 (1979); EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, GMAT BULLETIN OF INFORMATION 1980-81, at 
14-15 (1980). 
29. However, it would undoubtedly be possible to compile the disclosed information 
into a highly inflammatory expose, which would provide incentive by means of public 
embarrassment. But the process of making inflammatory the already known fact that 
test scores are partially invalid would necessitate so much distortion as to make the pro- 
ject of dubious social value. 
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However, a prohibition of admission testing would cause more 
injustice than it would remedy. Test scores, when combined with 
an applicant's previous grade point average, are the most valid 
indicator of the applicant's future academic performance that 
has yet been d e v e l ~ p e d . ~ ~  Although test scores are admittedly 
partially invalid, they are still a more valid criterion than any 
currently available replacement. If a legislature were to prohibit 
the use of test scores, it would only force colleges to use less 
valid criteria, resulting in even more injustice than presently ex- 
ists. Thus, prohibition of admission testing is not a desirable so- 
lution despite the partial invalidity of admission tests. 
B. Legal Standards for Testing 
Short of an outright prohibition, it would be possible to put 
more teeth in truth-in-testing statutes than the present disclo- 
sure provisions afford. This intermediate approach would proba- 
bly require setting a legal standard for test validity. For exam- 
ple, the legislature could determine an acceptable standard of 
validity for college admission testing or delegate the task of 
making such a determination to a regulatory agency.s1 
However, for such a standard to be more than rhetorical an 
enforcement mechanism capable of imposing sanctions would 
have to be provided. Sanctions would create serious drawbacks, 
however, for they interfere with the most valid, presently availa- 
ble criterion for making college admission decisions. Fines or 
damages would deprive testers of funds that could otherwise be 
used to improve the tests. An injunction or cease-and-desist or- 
der would amount to a prohibition and would also cut off any 
funds that would be gained from the fees of test takers. Thus, 
the imposition of sanctions necessary to enforce a legal standard 
for validity would not only interfere with use of the fairest ad- 
mission criterion available but would also hobble the efforts of 
the status quo toward developing a more valid criterion. 
Moreover, sanctions are unnecessary. Colleges already have 
an incentive to improve test validity as much and as quickly as 
possible. Legislative efforts to accomplish the same goal would 
be superfluous, if not completely counterproductive. 
30. EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, TEST USE AND VALIDITY 16-19 (1980). 
31. Alternatively, by setting no standard but creating a cause of action for aggrieved 
test takers, the legislature could leave the business of standard setting to the courts. 
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In summary, the partial invalidity of current college admis- 
sion tests is a serious problem, but New York's attempt to rem- 
edy it through disclosure legislation is ineffective. Efforts to put 
more teeth in the law, such as a categorical prohibition or a legal 
standard with sanctions for noncompliance would only aggravate 
the situation. Moreover, such efforts are unnecessary since the 
colleges as owners and users of the tests have the power and in- 
centive to bring about the desired improvements as rapidly as 
they can be achieved. 
However, it is important for colleges, legislatures, and their 
critics to remember than not all problems are readily soluble, if 
soluble at all. Our efforts to describe the mind by a simple set of 
numbers may suffer from some very fundamental limitations, as 
Kant believed. The quixotic search for improvements in this 
area may not yield great practical results, and in the end we may 
have to content ourselves with the best we have been able to 
produce, even though it may be far from ideal. 
Alan B. Asay 
